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Notes
Congressional Treatment of Confidential Business
Information: Proposals to Avert
Unwarranted Disclosure
Sensitive business information enjoys no guarantee of confidential treatment in the hands of congressional committees. The owners of this information face a real dilemma- Congress may require the submission of business
data essential to the effective implementation of its programs, but mishandling of this data may result in disclosure and uncompensable damage. The
businessman's fear of congressional disclosure is heightened when regulatory
agencies are required to transmit to Congress confidential information maintained by them pursuant to their regulatory functions, without judicial controls which would be privately available.
The private owners of confidential business information were unsuccessful
in their efforts to avert anticipated disclosure in the recent case of Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. FTC; I a federal court rejected their claim to an injunction to prevent agency release of such data to Congress. Ashland Oil thus constitutes an
appropriate vehicle through which this note examines opportunities for both
judicial and legislative action to alleviate the disclosure crisis produced by the
juxtaposition of attenuated governmental control of confidential information
against the increased use of such material. Problems endemic to both judicial
and legislative resolution of the disclosure issue are explored and countered
with suggested substantive and procedural proposals.
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: LEGISLATURE,
JUDICIARY, AND REGULATORY AGENCIES

In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC,2 the plaintiff, relying primarily on section
6(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 3 attempted to enjoin the Federal
1409 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C.), affd, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
2Id.
3The Commission shall also have power

To make public from time to time such portions of the information obtained by
it hereunder, except trade secrets and names of customers, as it shall deem expedient

in the public interest; and to make annual and special reports to the Congress and to
submit therewith recommendations for additional legislation; and to provide for the

publication of its reports and decisions in such form and manner as may be best
adapted for public information and use.
15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1970)
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Trade Commission (FTC) from delivering confidential gas reserve data to
Congress. 4 Ashland had provided the confidential data to the FTC pursuant
to federal law, 5 but feared public disclosure if the data was submitted to Congress. 6 Concurring in Ashland's evaluation that its data was competitively sensitive, the FTC denied a request by Congressman John E. Moss, in his individual capacity, for the confidential information. 7 However, the FTC
treated a subsequent request by Moss in his official capacity as the Chairman
of a congressional subcommittee as a "formal congressional request" and
ordered delivery of the data.a
4

Gas reserve data is confidential because "much like a patent or trade secret, [it] constitutes a valuable and closely guarded asset. Making this asset available to competitors, without
"Amerada Hess Corp.,
due compensation, would most certainly be inimical to competition ...
50 F.P.C. 1048, 1050 (1973). Owners of confidential information maintain the secrecy of their
data avoiding public disclosure which would cause competitive and economic disadvantage.
Much confidential natural gas reserve data fall within modem "trade secret" definitions; thus,
acquisition by improper means is subject to tort redress. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 474-78 (1974); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 303 (D.D.C. 1976);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment a at 3 (1939).
Congressional policy recognizes that confidential information does not belong in the
public domain. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970); S. REP. No.
813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966); 121
CONG. REc. 19340 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Roth). None of these congressional
nondisclosure policies applies to Congress, however. See note 6 infra.
'Ashland submitted data pursuant to FTC investigative authority granted under 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(b) (Supp. V 1975), non-compliance with which would have resulted in federally prescribed
penalties. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D.D.C. 1976).
6
Congress has exempted itself from application of numerous statutes preserving the confidential status of certain information. See note 4 supra & text accompanying. "A Congressional
commitment to respect the confidentiality of ... data [relating to the 'Arab Boycott' which had
been submitted under an executive pledge of confidentiality] 'would raise serious issues of congressional responsibility' by placing 'unconstitutional limits on the authority of Congress.' " The
Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1975, at 9, col. 4 (reported remarks of Rep. Moss). See also Halverson, An Anakysis of the Oil and Natural Gas Reserve Reporting Problem: The Government's
Need to Know Versus the Private Company's Need to Protect the Confidentiality of its Sensitive
Business Information, 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS TAX. 119, 126 (1976) [hereinafter cited as An
Analysis of the Reporting Problem].
7
Coming from an individual, Moss' request was subject to two public disclosure exemptions
of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) and (9) (1970). The FTC had
then determined it was without discretion to disclose such exempt material. But cf Charles River
Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C.C. 1975), modifying 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973)
(exemption from Act precludes mandatory disclosure, but exemption is not absolute). Accord,
Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
8
The FOIA specifically excludes Congress from section (b) public disclosure exemptions.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970). Thus, Congress may obtain information by traditional means of request or subpoena. See Federal Public Records Law: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov. Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Moss). FTC
regulations authorize release of information to congressional committees on request without the
initial determination, applicable to all other requesters, of whether the requested information is
exempt from disclosure. Compare 16 C.F.R. § 4.11(b)(1) (1976) with 16 C.F.R. § 4.11(a)(1)(iv)
(1976). Moss requested the information for committee oversight functions. See note 51 infra.
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Citing instances in which either Moss or his subcommittee had "failed to
accord confidentiality to admittedly sensitive trade materials," 9 Ashland
argued that section 6(f) prohibited such disclosure by the FTC to any third
party, including Congress.' 0 In opposition, Moss and the FTC urged that
release without a subpoena was justified because section 6(f) so mandated:
"[R]elying on legislative history, defendants Moss and FTC conclude that the
Commission was intended to be no more than . . . a convenient storehouse of
information readily accessible to the Congress."" Failing to resolve the issue,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals simply found that section 6(f) did
not prohibit release of the data on request, if Ashland made no showing of
imminent harm from public disclosure. A weighty presumption that Congress
would not abuse Ashland's data foreclosed the demonstration of imminent
12
harm, notwithstanding allegations of past breaches of confidentiality.
Congress is certainly entitled to all information necessary to perform its
constitutionally bestowed legislative duties.' 3 To insure that Congress obtains
all relevant information, the "necessary and proper" clause of the United
States Constitution,' 4 vesting in Congress all powers necessary to effectuate its
legislative duties, has been construed to grant the legislature an implied
power of compulsory process:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information... recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience
has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and
9409 F. Supp. at 308 n.14. Ashland alleged three past breaches of confidentiality: release
of proprietary information by Moss to the public in breach of an express agreement; publication
of detailed reserve estimates in committee reports and disclosure at hearings; and Moss' refusal to
respect confidentiality pledges made by the executive branch.
"Both the district and appellate courts rejected Ashland's argument. The district court
refused to enjoin dissemination of the data to Congress pursuant to a "valid" subpoena, absent
demonstration of imminent irreparable harm. Id. at 309. The court of appeals found that section 6(f) did not prohibit transmission of the data to Congress on request absent a similar
demonstration. 548 F.2d at 979.
"409 F. Supp. at 302.
rThe doctrine of separation of powers forces the judiciary to accord a coequal branch of
government, here Congress, a strong presumption of future behavioral propriety, notwithstanding
past breaches of confidentiality. See note 42 infra & text accompanying.
13
[T]he legislator is responsible to his electorate for his actions. Responsibility
means judgment, and judgment, if the word implies its intelligent exercise, requires
knowledge. . . . The very fact of representative government thus burdens the
legislature with this informing function. Nevertheless its first informing function lies to
itself, a necessary corollary of any legislative purpose.
Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L.
REv. 153, 205 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Limitations].
"
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Governmdnt of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.18.
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also the information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete;
so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed."
Long implemented by statute,1 6 the legislative subpoena power is broad:
coextensive with the power to legislate. This power is circumscribed, however,
by judicial application of a two-pronged test. Based on the language of the
statute,1 7 this test demands that the inquiry for which the subpoena has been
issued have an adequately defined valid legislative purpose and that Congress
8
establish the "pertinency" of information requested for that purpose.'
If both requirements of the test are not met, a subpoena will not be
judicially enforced. 19 Fundamental fairness demands that the individual have
sufficient notice of a legislative demand before risking penalties for non20
compliance with a potentially pertinent, authorized inquiry. Objection to a
subpoena based on a vague or sweeping enunciation of purpose or demand
for information not pertinent may be weighed by the judiciary against these

15McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927). Constitutional Limitations, supra note
13, provides a general discussion of the historical bases of the power. In McGrain, the Supreme
Court extended this implied power beyond its historical antecedents to reach the private sector.
As a result, Congress enjoys a unique prerogative to compel private individuals to appear before
its committees, there to give testimony and to produce records, notwithstanding the status of that
information in all other contexts. The power extends to congressional committees and subcommittees within their authorized jurisdictional boundaries. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 505 (1975); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200-01
(1957); United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 61 (D.D.C. Cir. 1947).
162U.S.C. § 192 (1970). This provision lends teeth to congressional compulsory process by
attaching criminal penalties for failure to respond to a congressional subpoena thus invoking
judicial aid to avoid contumacious conduct and delay in receiving information. See, e.g., Russell
v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 755-56 (1962); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 207
(1957); Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948).
1'2U.S.C. § 192 (1970):
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House
of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry
before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent
resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question
pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in
a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.
18See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200-06 (1957); United States v.
Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926, 933 (D.D.C. 1957), affd, 280 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on
other grounds, 369 U.S. 749 (1962). Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC employs the three part test articulated in Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1961). 409 F. Supp. at 305.
19See, e.g., Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 709 (1966) (dictum); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1962), rev'g
195 F. Supp. 588 (D.C. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962); United States v. Brewster, 154 F.
Supp. 126, 134 (D.D.C. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied,0 358 U.S. 842 (1958).
2 See generally Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929). But cf. Barenblatt v. United
States, 252 F.2d 129, 131-33 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affd, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (purpose derived
from piecemeal sources).
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two requirements which balance the public need for the information against
the individual's protestations of harm. If the legislative purpose is unclear, or
the information requested is not sufficiently material to the stated purpose,
the individual's interest in protecting his constitutional rights will outweigh
2
the presumptively heavy public interest in an informed legislature. '
Ashland Oil demonstrates the tension created when a regulatory agency
22
holds private confidential data ostensibly required by Congress to legislate.
The agency must weigh preservation of confidential private information 23 and
the future availability and procurement of similar data 24 against congressional demands. 2s Disclosure to Congress is favored by the special constitutional status of Congress, acting for the "public good," and by the understandable desire of the regulatory agencies to appear willing to comply with
26
congressional requests in this era of "government in the sunshine" openness

ZlAlthough historically privacy rights have been asserted against the subpoena power,
presumably civil suits asserting abrogation by subpoena of constitutionally protected property
rights may also be entertained. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (protecting privacy righti despite legislative prerogative).
2The tension arises where information is demanded from a third party, here the agency,
which cannot be expected to refuse to comply with compulsory process and place itself in contempt. The existence of a valid subpoena forestalled consideration of such tension in Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), presumably because Congress would
receive the information regardless of the source. Three concurring Justices, however, carefully
pointed out that this valid legislative activity did not preclude searching judicial scrutiny for lack
of validity in other cases:
When duly subpoenaed . . . such a person does not shed his constitutional right to
withhold certain classes of information ...
The Speech or Debate Clause cannot be used to avoid meaningful review of constitutional objections to a subpoena simply because the subpoena is served on a third
party.
Id. at 515-16. This viewpoint relates directly to Ashland, where no authorized subpoena compelled delivery of the information and immunized acts from scrutiny. See note 75 infra.
"The proprietary value of confidential data is discussed in note 4 supra. See also Levi,
Confidentiality and Democratic Government, 30-REc. BAR OF CITY OF N.Y. 323, 325 (1975)
("business requires some privacy as a'prerequisite to economic survival") [hereinafter cited as
Confidentiality].
"The chairman of the FTC has said that "the FTC has to consider the need for preserving
the effectiveness of its investigational, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions. We need. . . to
encourage respondents to provide confidential data voluntarily, thus avoiding time-consuming
subpoena enforcement activity ..
" Engman, Remarks, 34 Fat. B.J. 340, 341 (1975). Delay
from producers litigating compliance with agency subpoenas is illustrated by FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1975), modified, No. 74-1547 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 1977). See also
Reliability of Electric & Gas Service, 49 F.P.C. 1428, 1430 (1973) (producer reluctance to divulge
such information to the FPC hampers FPC's regulatory function).
sThe Attorney General stresses a balance of endeavor and accommodation of competing
values of "confidentiality, the right of the people to know, and the right of the government to
obtain important information." Confidentiality, supra note 23, at 334.
"See Edelstein, Foreward: Openness in Government: A New Era, 34 FED. B.J. 279 (1975):
Markham, Sunshine on the Administrative Process: Wherein Lies the Shade? 28 AD. L. Rav. 463
(1976).
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and public suspicion of governmental favoritism to big business. 27 Furthermore, a characterization of the independent regulatory agencies as "arms of
Congress," a characterization which stems from delegation to the agencies of
legislative investigative powers, 28 encourages disclosure.
Portraying the agencies as "arms of Congress" or storehouses of information may, however, be too simplistic. Enabling legislation often grants quasilegislative, -judicial and -executive powers to the regulatory agencies, making
classification difficult 29 and potentially misleading. Traditional agency
resistance to congressional information inquiries, prompting implementation
of the congressional subpoena power by statute,3 0 belies the superficial portrayal of these agencies as mere handmaidens of Congress. Ironically, agency
independence has elicited knowledgeable criticism that Congress has
abrogated its duty to make agencies accountable.
Absent unauthorized release, 3' no constraints prohibit agency release of
information to Congress without judicial enforcement of the subpoena standards.3 2 Yet opportunity exists for judicial action to prevent governmental
evasion of private rights.
2i'Ireatment of the problem in the context of the natural gas industry appears in An
Analysis of the Reporting Problem, supra at note 6.
"See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. at 302 (FTC "convenient storehouse of
information readily accessible to Congress"); Amerada Hess 50 F.P.C. 1048 (1973); Reliability of
Electric & Gas Service, 49 F.P.C. 1430 (1973) (FPC an "arm of Congress" which should be
responsive to legislative inquiries); Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in
Court: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 410 (1975 & 1976) [hereinafter cited as Representation of Congress].
29Note, Congressional Control of Agency Pri ilege, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 348, 356 (1976).
"Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 199. Assertions of "agency privilege" still
present difficulties. See generally Note, Congressional Control of Agency Privilege, 9 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 348 (1976).
31
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner
or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of
his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation
made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency
or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade
secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures, of
any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any income
return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be
seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined not more
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed
from office or employment.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) (emphasis added). See also note 4 supra.
"Administrative action is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1970), "to the extent that .. . agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
Section 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), allows the court to set aside agency action only where it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Thus, if
Congress receives information voluntarily submitted pursuant to statute, regulation or authorized
compulsory process, agency action is according to law or not committed to agency discretion. See
Amerada Hess Corp., 50 F.P.C. 1048, 1056-60 (1973) (dissenting opinion distinguishing public
from congressional release).
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THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Section 6() of The Federal Trade Commission Act
Whether the judiciary, in interpreting section 6(f) and analogous agency
could uniformly require a congressional subpoena

enabling legislation,3 3

before a regulatory agency must release confidential information remains an
unresolved issue. Section 6(f) has apparently never been construed, and the
4
Ashland Oil court reserved comment on the question . Contrary to FTC interpretation, compliance with congressional requests would not seem to be
mandated by section 6(f). The language of the section is clearly permissive,
5
bestowing on the FTC a discretionary power to report to Congress."
Legislative history supports the conclusion that delivery of confidential
data to Congress is not mandated.3 6 Although references to section 6(f) are
rare, ambiguous and inconclusive,3 7 they manifest no intent to impose affirmative duties on the FTC to surrender information on demand. On the contrary, remarks reveal that Congress contemplated an expert and independent
agency building up a "comprehensive body of information for the use and advantage of the Government."3 8 The Congress could then legislate effectively
with the aid of recomendations and analyses of conditions made available to
Congress.

9

3

"[T]he question of statutory interpretation posed by this case could have broad implications for Congress' ability to obtain information from the Executive Branch, since there are
nearly 100 statutes which, like § 6(0, prohibit disclosure of information by an Executive agency
but which do not expressly bar disclosure to Congress." Representation of Congress, supra note
28, at 410 (extract from Rep. Moss' Motion to Intervene in Ashland Oil).
31See 548 F.2d at 981-82 n.6.
3
1See 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1970). See note 3supra. See also notes 38-39 infra & text accompanying.
s6Created by Congress, the FTC's powers should be construed specifically pursuant to
statutory language. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Where, as here, that language accommodates more than one interpretation, the judiciary
must examine legislative history. Id. at 690.
SFloor debate before passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 focused on the
delegation of legislative investigatory functions to the FTC, not the subsequent use of material
gathered, and on incorporation of an "unfair competition" standard into the Act. Section 6(f)
was passed with little comment, appearing now in substantially the same language as the original
Senate and House Conference version of the trade bill. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 573, 63rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 13, 15 (1914) (comparative print of Senate and House bill versions); H.R. REP. No. 533,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1914) (" 'Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a commission,' but it has not been held that Congress may not by a commission elicit information.'
'S51 CONG. REc. 11089 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Newands, emphasis added). Comments
during House debate on Conference Report No. 1142, in part now section 6(f), equally
demonstrate the advisory nature of FTC reports to Congress. 51 CONG. REc. 14935 (1914)
(remarks of Rep. Stevens emphasizing the beneficial work of the FTC by recommendation and
expert aid). Accord, H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
"9The judiciary indirectly substantiated such an interpretation of section 6(f) in Humphrey's
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), by emphasizing the tripartite structure and in-
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Although a less permissive interpretation is possible, 40 without stronger
evidence that section 6(f) affirmatively increases Congress' power to acquire
information, the FTC would not appear statutorily compelled to furnish data
without a subpoena. Information held by an agency should be reachable only
by compulsory process subject to satisfaction of pertinency and purpose pro-

tections. Resistance to informal requests assures dissemination only to
authorized parties, providing some certainty of confidential treatment. Yet
these precautions, otherwise available to protesting individuals, would delay

congressional inquiry no more than private opposition. Where an agency
refused to strengthen its release procedures, judicially required subpoenas
would preserve confidentiality by averting unwarranted congressional requests.

41

Obstacles to Judicial Action
A judicial requirement of a subpoena may, however, be impractical for
four reasons. Foremost, a subpoena may provide scant protection for confidential information because separation of governmental powers constrains
judicial action. 42 Although Congress should adequately demarcate the independence of FTC, implying that its domination by any one branch of the government would
be impermissible:
The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of its [quasi[Ijts members
legislative and quasi-judicial] duties, act with entire impartiality ....
are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts "appointed by
law and informed by experience."
The debates in both houses demonstrate that the prevailing view was that the commission was not to be "subject to anybody in the government but ... only to the people
of the United States"; free from "political domination or control" ... to be "separate
and apart from any existing department of the government ..
Id. at 624-25. But cf. Representation of Congress, supra note 28, at 410 (Ashland's interpretation
of section 6(f) "would substantially undermine the access of Congress to the records maintained
by its agent, the Federal Trade Commission").
4

See 51 CONG. REC. 8852 (1914) (remarks of Reps. Bartlett and Stevens that FTC would
be required to report to Congress under section 6(f), giving whatever information it can to assist
it). Compare original House bill describing FTC annual report to Congress: "This report shall
contain such facts . . . collected by the commission as may be considered of value ... : Provided,
That no trade secrets . . . shall be embraced in any such abstract. . . . The report shall also include such recommendations . . . as the commission may deem necessary." H.R. REP. No. 533,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1914), with the superseding Senate version, 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1970), set
forth at note 3 supra.
41

The need for this judicial protection gains significance when juxtaposed against allegations of leaks of information. See notes 61-75 infra & text accompanying. When the FTC released information subject to an express confidentiality agreement over the telephone with less
than seventy-two hours' notice to the owners, precluding challenge of release, the court noted
tersely: "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . provide for motions to quash duly authorized
subpoenas, but not phone calls." FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137, 151 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The lack of protection to owners of information held by third parties was also emphasized in
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. at 513-18 (Marshall, J., concurring).
42Due to the theory of separate but equal governmental branches, the judiciary must
presume congressional propriety in all its legislative activities. Accordingly, this presumption encompasses congressional investigatory activity:
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vestigative jurisdiction of its committees and subcommittees,4 3 failure to do so
does not insure a successful challenge in court to an investigative committee
subpoena.44 Theoretically, courts construe vague or ambiguous investigatory
authorizations narrowly,' 5 but the presumption of propriety of congressional
action defeats all but gross deviations from purpose and relevancy. 46 "The exact scope of an investigation cannot always be charted and bounded in advance [thus] some discretion must be left to those to whom the task is entrusted, if the objective [i.e., legislating in the public interest,] is to be attained. ' 47 Admissible evidence must be responsive to the scope of legislative
48
inquiry which anticipates all possible cases, and is therefore quite broad.
Consequently, respect for the separation of powers has led the judiciary to
find a valid legislative purpose even where obtained from piecemeal sources.4 9
Coupled with the presumption that Congress will not abuse its inquisitorial
powers, the willingness to find a valid purpose and presume the materiality of
congressional inquiry effectively negates 'pertinency and purpose' challenges
otherwise available. ° Second, requiring a subpoena is tantamount to advocating agency and judicial resistance to rational pleas for increased congressional supervision of the regulatory agencies.5 1 Forcing Congress to subpoena
It would be intolerable if the judiciary were to intrude into the activities of the
legislative branch . . . and virtually stop the progress of an investigation, which is intended to secure information that Congress deems necessary and desirable in the proper exercise of its functions, unless the lack of materiality and relevancy of the subject
matter is clear and manifest.
United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 61 (D.D.C. 1947). See also ConstitutionalLimitations,
supra note 13, at 219. The presumption of propriety covers congressional treatment of information received as well:
Ashland suggests that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that . . . "there has
been no promise or commitment that Ashland's trade secret data would be given confidential treatment." While the Court can appreciate Ashland's concern . . . itdoes
not appear to the Court that isolated instances of breached confidentiality in the past
are sufficient to overcome the continuing presumption of Congressional propriety.
409 F. 3 Supp. at 308 (citation omitted).
' See Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 716 (1966); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.

178, 201 (1957); Brewster v. United States, 255 F.2d 899, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'g 154 F.
Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958).
4See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 61, 63 (D.D.C. 1947), affd sub nom.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843
(1948).
"See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 204 (1957); United States v. Tobin,
195 F. Supp. 588, 598 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 306 F.2d 270, 274-75 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
"See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175-77 (1927); United States v. Bryan, 72
F. Supp. 58, 61 (D.D.C. 1947), affd sub nom. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.
1948).
7United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 63 (D.D.C. 1947).
"Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
4See Barenblatt v. United States, 252 F.2d 129, 130-31 (D.C. Cir. 1958). But cf. Tobin v.
United States, 306 F.2d 270, 274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1962), rev'g 195 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1961)
(more explicit authorization required for inquiry undertaken).
"0See cases cited note 46 supra.
"lAdams, Sunset: A Proposalfor Accountable Government, 28 Ad. L. Rev. 511 (1976);
Kennedy, Regulatory Reform: A Confused NationalIssue, 28 Ad. L. Rev. 447 (1976); Ribicoff,
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confidential data mildly impedes the oversight of regulatory agencies. Third,
unlike an individual choice to risk all to protect private rights, placing an
agency chairman in contempt of Congress for failure to divulge subpoenaed
information may be inappropriate. Expecting agency noncompliance is
unrealistic when the agency may legally deliver the information to Congress
52
and disclaim responsibility for subsequent improper handling of it. Finally,
requiring a subpoena may be procedurally difficult. The owner of confidential data must have notice of impending disclosure to mount an injunctive
challenge to its release to Congress. If the judiciary is then unwilling to weigh
policy reasons for requiring stricter protections for confidential information,"3
any challenge may fail, particularly if the agency labels its reply to Congress'
request a "special report" or its equivalent, which section 6(f), for example,
54
grants the FTC power to forward to Congress voluntarily at any time.
Prophylactic Effect Outweighs Inadequacies
Despite potential inadequacies tempering the effectiveness of requiring a
pre-release subpoena, the subpoena procedure may be a small cost to pay to
insure the individual primary restraints on congressional information acqusition. Stricter enforcement of pertinency and purpose requirements weeds out

unwarranted claims to information.5 Judicial scrutiny at this stage is particularly appropriate because the conflicting congressional and private constitutional rights involved require delicate balancing, a task for which the
judiciary is uniquely equipped. 6 Additionally, little realistic risk of contempt
Congressional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 Ad. L. Rev. 415 (1976); and Note, Congressional Control of Agency Privilege, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 348 (1976). Congressional oversight
duties are defined by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, § 136, 60 Stat. 832
(1946), as amended by 2 U.S.C. § 190(d) (Supp. V 1975). For a general discussion of oversight
seeJ. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1964).
"See Reliability of Electric Gas & Service, 49 F.P.C. at 1430-31. The agency is not responsible for information legally leaving its control. However, the FPC, in releasing information to
Congress, made such disclosure "expressly subject to the requirements of confidentiality and protection against public disclosure as set forth in all related orders of this Commission." Amerada
Hess Corp., 50 F.P.C. at 1051. Such expression of policy does not bind Congress. See The
Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1975, at 9, col. 4 (remarks of Rep. Moss, set forth at note 6supra).
"sThe policy considerations collected in this note include the inadequate protection afforded the owners of information held by a third party, particularly in light of the penalties imposed
for failure to submit the information to the third paty; the fact that congressional disclosure may
hamper future agency and congressional acquisition of even mandatorily submitted data; and
that delay in congressional acquisition due to a subpoena's being required merely averts
legislative excess without precluding authorized access.
415 U.S.C.,5 46(f) (1970). No specific time is assigned for transmission of special reports.
Construed in another context, "special reports" consist of any information beyond the ordinary
data of a routine annual report. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 174 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir.
1949). However, note that the FTC's reliance on section 6(f) may be makeweight. The FPC has
asserted the need to comply with less than legally sufficient compulsory process due to the special
relation to (ongress arising from delegation of legislative functions to them.
"'See note 41 supra.
"Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1113, 1175 (1973).
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proceedings threatens an agency chairman, just as a private owner is unlikely
to subject itself to such action. Given a legally insufficient congressional demand, the agency should notify the owner, allowing it to attempt to enjoin
delivery of data and terminating agency responsibility. 57 Urgent demands may
preclude notification and challenge, requiring the agency to act for the owner
in attacking the request.58 Protection thus afforded appeases the owner, who
can do no more privately, enhancing the agency's ability to elicit similar in59
formation in the future.
Congress will normally be entitled to information demanded, notwithstanding subpoena requirements which provide some initial assurance of proper acquisition. 60 Assuming Congress acquires the information it seeks, attention then focuses directly on unwarranted congressional release of data by a
committee, a member or a staff member. Such abuse of the information
privilege may subvert congressional recognition of the need for confidentiality
of this information.
CONGRESSIONAL TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

ProceduralInadequacies
Tension arises at the congressional level, not because Congress is not entitled to information, but because no guarantees of confidentiality or adequate protections exist at that level. Currently each House of Congress has independent rules governing administration of its hearings and meetings-65 Pro5
Action by the owner to protect its information was acceptable with respect to congressional requests and administrative subpoenas in Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297
(D.D.C.), affd, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and in FTC v. Texaco, 517 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir.
1975), modified by No. 74-1547 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 1977). The Supreme Court has recognized that a
third party could not be expected to refuse compliance with a subpoena and place itself in contempt,
thus foreclosing the traditional means of raising defenses to compulsory process. Eastland v. United

States Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1975).

5
"Requiring the agency to act as surrogate owner could be accomplished judicially or
legislatively. A strict judicial subpoena requirement would foreclose unwarranted agency release
and give the individual the level of protection he would demand for himself. Alternatively, the
congressional policy of nondissemination of confidential material, see note 4 supra, argues that
Congress shoud expect and require the agencies to restrict legislative access to such information.
Access restrictions could be incorporated into agency enabling legislation or inserted in agnecy
regulations.
5
9See note 24 supra & text accompanying.
'0 If allegations of information leaks by Congress continue, however, perhaps the judicial
presumption of legislative propriety will come to be more easily rebutted.
*iTitle I of the Government in the Sunshine Act, a uniform measure to open committee
meetings to the public, introduced as S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 529 (daily ed.
Jan. 15, 1975), was deleted from the Act when the report from the Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration recommended that openness in Government "would more properly be achieved by direct amendment of the Standing Rules.
S. REP. No. 381, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1975).
Currently committee meetings and hearings in the House of Representatives are governed
by House Rule XI, clauses 2(g)(1) and 2(g)( 2 ), H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
Senate meetings and hearings are held pursuant to Senate Rule XXV, § 7(b), S. Doc. No. 1,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). as amended by S. Res. 9, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), and 2 U.S.C.
§ 190a-1(b) (1970).
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cedural variations distinguish hearings and meetings, and each committee or
subcommittee may adopt such rules and regulations as are perceived
necessary for its governance. 62 When sensitive testimony is to be given, a
general presumption of open committee meetings and hearings may be overcome by a vote in public session to close all or a portion of any hearing or
meeting.63 Procedures and standards for rebutting the presumption of open64

ness vary.
A voted exception to a policy of open proceedings is thought to preserve
flexibility by allowing each committee, based on its own experience, to strike
an effective balance between confidentiality and public information. 65
However, such variable procedure fosters unpredictable latitude among committees in closing proceedings and a confusing diversity of practice 66 defeating
the imperative preservation of confidentiality.
With a philosophy of "government in the sunshine" prevailing, 67 there is
now, more than ever, opportunity for unwitting or untraceable leaks of con"Compare 2 U.S.C. § 109a (1970) (Senate committee meeting procedure) with 2 U.S.C. §
190a-1 (1970) (Senate committee hearing procedure). Committee and subcommittee rules are

adopted under 2 U.S.C. § 190a-2 (1970) (Senate committees) and House Rule XI, clause 2(a),
H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
63The House rule for closing meetings for the transaction of business is House Rule XI,
clause 2(g)(1), H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 421-22 (1974), providing:
Each meeting for the transaction of business, including the markup of legislation, of
each standing committee or subcommittee thereof shall be open to the public except
when the committee or subcommittee, in open session and with a quorum present,
determines by rollcall vote that all or part of the remainder of the meeting shall be
closed to the public.
The analogous House rule with respect to hearings is House Rule XI, clause 2 (g)(2 ), H.R. Doc.
No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 422 (1974), providing for open hearings except
when the committee or subcommittee, in open session and with a quorum present,
determines by rollcall vote that all or part of the remainder of that hearing on that
day shall be closed to the public because disclosure of testimony, evidence, or other
matters to be considered would endanger the national security or would violate any
law or rule of the House of Representatives.
By contrast, the later Senate rule lists specific guidelines paralleling the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V. 1975), for closure of meetings to the public,
see notes 94-95 infra & text accompanying, and provides:
Each meeting ... including meetings to conduct hearings, shall be open to the public.
except that a meeting or series of meetings by a committee or a subcommittee thereof
on the same subject for a period of no more than fourteen calendar days may be closed to the public on a motion made and seconded to go into closed session to discuss
only whether the matters enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (6) would require the
meeting to be closed followed immediately by a record vote in open session by a majority of the members of the committee or subcommittee . ..
Senate Rule XXV, § 7(b), as amended by S. Res. 9, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Senate
procedure for open hearings, 2 U.S.C. § 190a-1(b) (1970), affords less specific closure guidelines,
but does direct attention to confidential matters: "Each hearing conducted .. .shall be open to
the public except when . . . the testimony to be taken . . . may divulge matters deemed con-

fidential under other provisions of law or Government regulation."
'See note 63 supra.
65121 CONG. REC. S19337-38 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Cannon as to
change in procedures).
6See Id. at S19339 (remarks of Sen. Chiles).
67
"While recognizing the need for some closed proceedings, we set as a basic goal the opening of committee activities to full public view, including, under reasonable restrictions and rules,
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fidential data both to the public and to competitors.6" In fact, protection by
Congress has become so inadequate that one commehtator notes:
[T]he Attorney General . . . has recently admitted that the risk that con-

fidential and valuable commercial information may reach the public domain
after submission to Government is "ever present."
...[A]s we have recently learned .. .information available to Congress
means information available to the general public and to competitors ...
interchange
[contravening] the free competitive system which argues against
69
of competitively sensitive information among competitors.
Although in theory Congress punishes the transgressions of its rules by its
own members, 70 leaks are often not traceable to any particular individual.
They may result from presentation of testimony and documents in public
committee proceedings, publication in a committee report or unwarranted
access by unauthorized staff and members of the public.7 1 Illustrative of the
problem under current procedures are the following congressional observations on a recent leak of sensitive intelligence information:
The rules and security regulations adopted by the Select Committee were
adequate. They were not, however, strictly adhered to or executed.
... [S]taff assistants to various Members of the Select Committee, not subject to the restraints put on Committee staff personnel, [reportedly] had considerable access to matters investigated by the Select Committee.
... [A]pparently little or no effort was made to insure Members and staff
personnel left behind documents they obtained during their affiliation with
the Committee. A number of classified and highly sensitive documents were
discovered . . still in the possession of Select Committee72 Members and staff
personnel months after that Committee ceased to exist.

Lack of Redress
Magnifying the inadequacy of procedural safeguards controlling congressional handling of confidential information, monetary recovery for the
the televising, broadcasting, and photographing of commlitee hearings." H.R. -REP. No. 1215,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4417, 4419.
65
The potentially adverse effect of "sunshine" legislation on competition in the administrative context is discussed in Markham, Sunshine on the Administrative Process: Wherein
Lies the Shade? 28 AD. L. REv. 463 (1976). See also Edelstein, Foreward: Openness in Government: A New Era, 34 FED. B.J. 279, 279-80 (1975).
69An Analysis of the Reporting Problem, supra note 6, at 120, 134.
""Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for
2.
...
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl.
disorderly Behavior.
"See, e.g., Doe v. McMillian, 412 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1973); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409
F. Supp. 297, 308 n.14 (D.D.C. 1976).
72HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, REPORT ON INVESTIGATION PURSUANT
TO

H.

RES. 1042 CONCERNING UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION OF THE REPORT OF THE SELECT COM-

Mi-rEE ON INTELLIGENCE, H.R. REP. No. 1754, 94th Cong., 2d
cited as REPORT ON INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO H. RES. 1042].

Sess. 41-42 (1976) [hereinafter
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destruction of valuable property rights resulting from disclosure, otherwise
74
7
potentially compensable under the fifth amendment " or by a tort action, is
pretermitted by judicial expansion of legislators' immunity from suit under
7
the Speech or Debate Clause. 5 Regrettably, lack of compensation for the
destruction of property rights embodied in confidential industry data may
controvert the public interest Congress seeks ultimately to serve, and may
make it more difficult for Congress to obtain information in the future. The
natural gas industry illustrates the potential adverse impact disclosure may
have on the public interest:
In a period when the gas supply shortage is most acute, disclosure of detailed
reserve data would undoubtedly inhibit future exploration for new gas

reserves since speculators and competitors could equally benefit from the
. . . expenditures of other companies.

76

.

Even if not entirely deterred from developing reserve data, the increased risk
accompanying expenditures to acquire the information may ultimately be
77
reflected in rising fuel prices. .
Persistent failure to provide adequate redress may reduce the amount of
information voluntarily supplied to agencies and Congress. Moreover,
although owners of confidential data cannot falsify or withhold requested
73"[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. At
least one FPC commissioner has expressed the explicit fear that congressional disclosure can
destroy proprietary rights and that "a Congressional committee may render nugatory the supposed Constitutional guarantees of due process, by taking valuable [gas reserve] information
• . . without the payment of just compensation." Amerada Hess Corp., 50 F.P.C. 1048, 1060
(1973) (dissent). The majority infers this also. Id. at 1050.
"See note 4 supra.
"Legislators, and their aides and staff acting as agents, enjoy immunity from prosecution
for actions within the sphere of "legislative activity." See Doe v. McMillian, 412 U.S. 306 (1973);
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972). This is true
even though the acts or words are knowingly false or wrong. See Barsky v. United States, 167
F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Based on the speech or debate clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 6,
cl.1, the immunity has been expanded by the judiciary to foreclose any civil or criminal proceedings against a legislator acting within the legitimate sphere of legislative activity including
acts pursuant to an authorized subpoena. See Note, Constitutional Law-Legislative Immunity
Outweighs First Amendment Rights, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1195, 1196-99 (1976). Non-legislative
acts are granted no immunity. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 323-24 (1973); See, e.g., Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 306, 323-24 (1973); Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir.
1970). See generally Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilegeand the Separationof Powers, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973). Although designed "to protect the integrity of the legislative process by
insuring the independence of individual legislators," United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507
(1972), and not to accord legislative supremacy, id. at 508, expansive judicial interpretation of
"legislative activity" has been allowed to bar private challenge.
"Reliability of Gas & Electric Service, 49 F.P.C. 1428, 1429 (1973) (emphasis added). Accord, An Analysis of the Reporting Problem, note 6 supra, at 136. See also Placid Oil Co. v.
FPC, 483 F.2d 880, 894 n.13 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S.
283 (1974).
"The FPC has the statutory duty not only to guard consumers against super-profits reaped
from artificially inflated rates, but also to protect consumer interests by making sure that the rate
schedule is high enough to elicit an adequate supply. 483 F.2d at 894 n.13.
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records where judicially compelled, 78 they can substantially delay agency and
congressional action by resisting questionnaires, subpoenas, etc. 79 Without
speedy access to reliable industry data, congressional policymaking in quickly
evolving fields such as energy could be seriously impeded. 0 Although Congress needs a measure of immunity in order to legislate free from litigious
plaintiffs, absolute immunity which abrogates private constitutional rights requires reexamination of the means by which Congress and the courts may
best serve the public interest.
Judicial Initiative To Promote CongressionalProtection
Because the judiciary traditionally deals with conflicts of constitutional
rights, 8 ' judicial scrutiny of Congress' treatment of confidential information is
justified in a situation such as Ashland Oil,82 where the owner of information
faces penalties for not submitting its data to the regulatory agency and yet
has no control over its dissemination once the agency turns the data over to
Congress. Unwarranted revelation of such data is best. averted when the
judiciary provides an objective judgment of the deliberation backing specific
disclosures. Notwithstanding the presumptively weighty legislative right to be
adequately informed, private property rights asserted in relation to confidential information are also based on the Constitution and demand fair protection. 83 Since the judiciary expanded the immunity currently denying adequate
protection against, or compensation for, destruction of property rights, the
84
judiciary could reexamine the basis for the immunity and narrow it.
In fact,
"See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1970).
79See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 517 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1975), modified by No. 74-1547
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 1977); Recent Cases-NationalParks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 88
HARV. L. REv. 470, 476 (1974). Chairman Engman, when the FTC released Ashland's data to
Congress, noted that litigation between the Commission and companies refusing to provide such
data continued and emphasized that:
As a result, your Subcommittee will receive data only from those companies which
have voluntarily complied with the Commission's orders. This fact is not lost upon
companies faced with information requests from the Commission and will do little to
encourage voluntary compliance, especially if any sensitive information is made public.
409 F. Supp. at 301.
"See An Analysis of the Reporting, supra note 6, discussing the rapid bureaucratic
developments designed to cope with the recent "energy crisis." See also, Ribicoff, Congressional
Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 AD. L. REv. 415, 419 (1976) (Congress relies on agencies
for "hard facts").
"Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Pri ilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 1113, 1174-75 (1973).
82409 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1976), affd, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"Reinstein & SilvergIate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 1113, 1174-75 (1973).
"Critics of absolute immunity emphasize its creation to insure independence from executive
interference and urge a traditional balancing of interests in private civil suits alleging violation of
private constitutional rights with a potential yielding of the privilege to the individual rights. Id.
See also Yankwich, The Immunity of CongressionalSpeech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99
U. PA. L. REv. 960 (1951).
Although recent Supreme Court doctrine upholds the absolute nature of the immunity,
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recent case law suggests that congressional immunity is being circumscribed. 5
Supporters of absolute immunity for legislators assert, however, that once
Congress has obtained confidential information, judicial scrutiny interferes
with the independence of the legislature.8 6 The separation of powers doctrine
and the presumption of proper congressional behavior, limiting judicial action in related contexts, intimate that the judiciary may not be willing to tell
Congress which information appropriately belongs in the public domain, its
competitive and confidential nature notwithstanding. 87 Because effective
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), the Court has also reaffirmed
that:
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is speech or debate
in either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters, they must
be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members
participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and
passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the
Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.
Gravel v. United States. 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). A congressional report examining the Department of Justice's representation of congressional interests in court reflects concern at the narrowing of the immunity by gradual re-definition of "legislative activity." See REPRESENTATION OF
CONGRESS, supra note 28 at 3.
5
8 McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1975), remanded on other grounds, No.
73-1991 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1976).
In sum, even if Congress' use of material injurious to private reputation is protected
for the purpose of issuing subpoenas, writing reports, and deliberating on legislation,
the immunity afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause ceases if that material is
disseminated either to the Executive or to the public at large.
521 F.2d at 1040. Accord, No. 73-1991 at 13-16, 41.
8
See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law-Legislative Immunity Outweighs First Amendment
Rights, 27 MERCER L. REv. 1195 (1976). The judiciary is by far the most ardent supporter of the
privilege. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501-03 (1975);
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617-18 (1972).
87
When revelation of information in a committee report impinged on individual privacy
rights, Mr. Justice Blackmun emphatically concurred in the majority's refusal to question congressional discretion to collect and to include the information in its report:
Stationing the federal judiciary at the doors of the Houses of Congress for the purpose
of sanitizing congressional documents in accord with this Court's concept of wise
legislative decisionmaking policy appears to me to reveal a lack of confidence in our
political processes and in the ability of Congress to police its own members. It is inevitable that occasionally, as perhaps in this case, there will be unwise and even harmful choices made by Congress in fulfilling its legislative responsibility. That, however, is
the price we pay for representative government. I am firmly convinced that the abuses
we countenance in our system are vastly outweighed by the demonstrated ability of the
political process to correct overzealousness on the part of elected representatives.
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 338 (1973). See also McSurely v. McClellan, No. 73-1991, slip
op. at 16 n.30 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1976).
Although the McSurely court distinguished congressional use of information from its
dissemination to the public, that court also noted:
It would appear impossible for the courts to make detailed assessments of the propriety
of ea.cindividual item of information obtained from a particular source by Congressional investigators, or revealed at a Congressional hearing, without engaging in exactly the kind of inquiry into motives that the Speech or Debate Clause was intended to
foreclose.
521 F.2d 1024, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). But see Representation of Congress,
supra note 28, quoting the Ashland court's displeasure with the scope of the immunity, given
protection of confidential information in all other situations, when it questioned "whether Cogress [sic], in its legislative function, has the right to set aside its own legislation imposing secrecy
on other parties." Id. at 408.

1977]

CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION

judicial response to congressional information mishandling is unlikely, the
ultimate means of redress lies with Congress.
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Congress itself has recognized the inappropriateness of placing confidential data in the public domain; 8 n thus, congressional self-restraint is imperative to accord sensitive data the confidentiality it deserves. The legislative
solutions here proposed, calling for congressional self-command, should
ameliorate potential abuse by promoting selective disclosure and by providing
redress for unwarranted damage. 89 Congressional access to and use of confidential information to legislate effectively should not be hindered; therefore
under the proposed solutions Congress remains free to independently judge
the confidential nature of particular information."0
ProceduralProtections
Initially, two broad procedural improvements are necessary: greater
uniformity of committee procedure in dealing with confidential data, and
organization of a staff specifically charged with evaluation and supervision of
allegedly confidential data.
Uniformity of committee procedure is directed at the problem of substantial variations now manifest in the rules of the House and Senate and their
numerous committees. 91 Such variations create confusion, particularly under
attenuated House guidelines, 92 about what circumstances justify closing a
meeting or hearing to the public. Where closure guidelines are ambiguous,
committees are free to resist fragmenting proceedings into potentially inefficient public and nonpublic sessions by failing to require closure, thereby
93
defeating confidentiality.

$$See note 4 supra. Note the partial step by the Senate toward greater specificity of subjects
proper for closure of committee proceedings, see note 63 supra and notes 94-95 infra & text accompanying.
19[I]mplicit in the concept of government . . . is the need and hence right to maintain the confidentiality of information. Confidentiality cannot be without limit ...
and must be balanced against the right of all citizens to be informed about the conduct of their government. An exercise of discretion is clearly required. In each instance the respective interests must be assessed so that ultimately the public interest
may be served.
Confidentiality, supra note 23, at 332.

9OSee The Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1975, at 9, col. 4 (reported remarks of Rep. Moss).
91
See note 63 supra.
"8See note 63 supra;
5

note 94 infra.
' Resistance to fragmentation of proceedings into open and closed portions, the latter with
limited staff help, is reflected by Reps. Landrum and Gibbons' colloquy during House debate on
H.R. Res. 259, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 6713 (1973):
[I]f we have to close the meeting we are precluding any expert whatsoever from any
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Uniformity modifications emulating Senate rules for open and closed proceedings would provide guidelines encouraging closure in particular situations.9 4 For example, Senate meetings, including meetings to conduct hearings, may be closed to the public when testimony or discussion may disclose
information relating to trade secrets or commercial or financial information
pertaining to a given person, where a congressional act requires governmental
officers and employees to keep the information confidential, or where the information has been obtained by the government on a confidential basis and
must be kept secret to prevent undue injury to the person's competitive position. 95 These guidelines stimulate the expectation of closure in particular
situations, allowing prior planning for presentation of sensitive material in
large segments in nonpublic proceedings. Additionally, given more standardization, changeovers between open and closed sessions would be less confusing and more controllable, particularly as greater uniformity would create
relatively static categories of individuals permitted to attend closed sessions or
otherwise deal with confidential information, thus reducing administrative
difficulties of controlling access to such data.
However, no closure procedure is effective if laxly applied. Thus, control
of unauthorized access to confidential data would be placed in the hands of a
staff charged with monitoring closed hearings and with distributing and collecting confidential documents from a central location. Even assuming good
faith congressional action, such documentary supervision would help prevent
information leaks by aides, printers, secretaries and the public.
In addition to monitoring access to data, the staff would initially evaluate
and classify information acquired by committees to determine whether it
merits confidential treatment. 96 Staff demarcation of sensitive portions would
department of the Government assisting us .... [W]e could not operate . . . without
the expertise and computers which we have to rely upon.
We can open the meeting if we need to do that.
Open every 5 minutes and close them every 5 minutes ....
[W]e ought to get
revolving doors.
"The Senate rules, supra note 63, suggest meetings be closed where congressional enactments or special agreements require confidentiality to preserve the competitive position of the
submitting party. Similarly, Senate hearing procedures encourage nonpublic session where the
hearing "may divulge matters deemed confidential ....
2 U.S.C. § 190a-l(b) (1970).
By contrast, House rules for meetings provide no closure guidelines, and House hearings
procedure merely suggests nonpublic session where "disclosure of testimony . . . would endanger
the national security or would violate any law or rule of the House of Representatives." House
Rule XI,
clause 2 (g)(2 ), H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 422 (1974).
95
Senate Rule XXV, § 7(b), as amended by S. Res. 9, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
"The staff would provide an independent appraisal of data submitted, based on their own
expertise and objective consideration of accompanying legends prepared by information owners,
to flag attention to potentially sensitive portions. See O'Reilly, Government Disclosure of Private
Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act, 30 Bus. LAWYER 1125, 1144-46 (1975) (protection of business secrets held by an agency). See also, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F.
Supp. 633, 637 (E.D. Va. 1975) (hearings ordered to consider portions legended by owner). Staff
appraisal would extend to expert affidavits and memoranda, such as the judiciary use in the
FOIA context. 'See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1249-50
(E.D. Va. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1007 (D.C.C. 1974); Hughes
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flag congressional attention to data not appropriate for public dissemination. 97 Where public dissemination of some information was favored, aggregations of composite data prepared by the staff would generally satisfy the
public need to know and preserve the owner's competitive advantage. 98
Where detailed, identifiable information was to be released, the staff could
notify the owner of impending dissemination. Such notification would foster
carefully considered disclosure while affording the owner an opportunity to
challenge disclosure in court before release mooted the issue. 99
Creation of such a staff concededly encounters initial technical difficulties. Staff members must be sufficiently expert to judge whether information deserves confidential treatment. To insure experienced evaluation and to
avert attempts to misuse information, a relatively stable group is preferable.
Staff members might be drawn from various committee staffs dealing with
confidential information or from industry, assigned permanently to this staff.
The potential for misuse of information by staff members themselves
raises the issue of staff immunity, requiring reexamination of the extent to
which the definition of "legislative activity" shields their work from
scrutiny. 00 Moreover, a staff which monitors use of documents and inAircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The staff could readily
assess agency warnings as to the sensitivity of submitted materials. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 300-01 (1976); Reliability of Electric & Gas Service, 49 F.P.C. 1428,
1431 (1973).
'7 Legislators' awareness of certain information's sensitivity is imperative to prevent careless
handling of documents and to insure that nonpublic testimony remains confidential. See, e.g.,
United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 1953) (refusal to testify before nonpublic session of Senate committee due to fear of newspaper publication of testimony).
98

.

.

Government agencies should be educated on the necessity for some leeway in
reporting [gas] reserves, since [it] is not an exact science....
... [G]overnment agencies and Congress ought to be convinced . . . that the
publication of aggregate proved reserves ... ought to be enough to satisfy the interests
of the American public. Other information may be needed for internal use by government policyrnakers but should remain in the hands of those in Government who have a
"need to know" and should not, absent some overwhelming public policy argument,
become a part of the public domain where one competitor could use it in a way inconsistent with the ideals underlying our free competitive system.
An Analysis of the Reporting Problem, supra note 6, at 136 (recommending standardization of
reporting procedures). See also Natural Gas Supplies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigationsof the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 17, 55-59 (1976) (United States Geological Survey access to and experience dealing with
confidential information suggests that a staff could by verification prepare aggregate data for
public release). This approach is analogous to FOIA protection of confidential information by
composite disclosure and deletion of identifying details. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. FPC,
519 F.2d 31, 36 (5th Cir. 1975) (impersonal data fulfills public need for accurate information).
"Both trial and appellate courts in Ashland Oil suggested that sufficient demonstration of
focused impact from imminent release would rebut the weighty presumption of congressional
propriety and justify enjoining release. 409 F. Supp. at 308-09 and 548 F.2d at 979. But the
Supreme Court has hinted that some "unwise and even harmful" congressional choices may be
the price of representative government. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 338 (1973) (Blackmun,

J. concurring).
'**To the extent aides and staff act as legislators' agents, they receive immunity for
legislative acts as if performed by the legislator personally. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,
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vestigates alleged information leaks, there being no present organization to
handle this function, 0 1 requires security and inquiry skills not found in
specialists at analyzing business data. Bifurcation into two staff groups, with
separate security and substantive duties, would alleviate procedural problems,
but would frustrate desired core control by one staff.
Substantive Protections
Despite procedural precautions, unwarranted disclosure could still occur.
Redress for damage must therefore be made available. 02 Unlike an attempted suit against a congressman or aide where success rests on the scope of the
definition given to "legislative activity" immunized by the Constitution,
redress would be "impersonally" founded on governmental negligence causing
a "taking" of property rights which should not be kept entirely uncompensable. 10 3 To avoid the sovereign immunity bar, an appropriate basis of redress
must be discovered or enacted. Four possible substantive bases now exist.
616-17 (1972). This immunity includes information-gathering in preparation for a hearing.
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), but immunity is not extended
to acts not essential to legislating, United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), or to certain
criminal acts, Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 622. Thus, unauthorized release of confidential information by staff members should be subject to the criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
1905 (1970) as not "necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such [congressional] deliberations." United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1972).
0
1' See REPORT ON INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO H. RES. 1042, supra note 72, at 44 (proposing staff investigation into alleged leaks of security information).
0
1 2Compensation
alleviates the impact of disclosure, averting competitive damage by restoring funds used to develop confidential information. See O'Reilly, Government Disclosure of
Private Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 1125, 1146 (1975). Absent
compensation, disclosure should constitute a "taking" of property for public use without just
compensation. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 303-04 (D.D.C. 1976);
Reliability of Electric & Gas Service, 49 F.P.C. 1428, 1429 (1973). Fifth amendment compensation has not apparently been extended to confidential information, but governmental liability for
these legally recognized economic advantages, United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S.
499, 502 (1945), would appropriately follow the theory supporting required compensation in eminent domain: "[J]ust as the government has to pay for the property it deliberately takes, it should
have to pay for the deliberate choices it makes to engage in activities which it knows in advance
are sure to cause exceptional losses to private parties." K, DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 25.17, at 504 (1958). Eminent domain "takings" have encompassed intangible rights related to
the physical thing creating an ownership interest. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp..
323 U.S. 373, 377-78, 380 (1945). Confidential data gives rise to analogous intangible rights.
Governmental release of confidential data to the public could thus constitute a "taking" without
requiring a reciprocal governmental benefit therefrom, as "the deprivation of the former owner
rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking." Id. at
378.
Thus, although governmental regulation and oversight of business is desirable in the public
interest, "a beneficient governmental unit ought not to allow exceptional losses to be borne by
those upon whom the governmental activity has happened to inflict them." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.17, at 504 (1958). This argument is particularly compelling
where a company such as Ashland submits its data, which subsequently is released to Congress

and becomes potentially subject to public revelation, while parallel companies resist compliance
and impede efficient governmental action yet avoid public release problems. See note 79 supra.
iosPotential litigation may arise in defining particular information as sufficiently valuable to
constitute a legally protected property interest and whether disclosure during congressional com-
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The Tucker Act0 4 grants jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear any
claims against the United States founded, inter alia, on the Constitution
where there is a "specific finding that the Government has taken vested property rights of the plaintiffs."10 5 However, since a complaint under the
Tucker Act must specifically allege acts of taking by the United States to state
a claim to which the United States will be deemed to have consented," 6 an
action based on an untraceable leak of confidential information may lack the
specificity required. On the other hand, lost property rights may be sufficiently significant to demand minimal extension of the Act to meet the less
specific pleading this constitutional claim allows.
The Federal Tort Claims Act'0 7 also requires specific allegations of
negligent or wrongful acts or omissions by government officials or
employees."' s To establish governmental liability, the allegedly negligent individual must have been acting within the scope of his employment 0 9
Because a claim of negligent failure to follow committee procedures lacks
specific accusations against a particular individual, a Federal Tort Claims Act
suit might not succeed. Attempted specific allegations, for example charging
negligence by the chief of staff, might fail as unwarranted leaks and arguably
outside the scope of an employee's duties. 10 Further, the Act is based on tort
and only information defined as a "trade secret" would support a suit."' No
specific provision of the Act would apply on the Ashland Oil facts, and, since
mittee activity constitutes a "taking" for a "public use."
The suit is based on general governmental negligence, and not specific individual action,
because tort recovery otherwise available for destruction of property rights is confined to trade
secret information. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). Certain confidential commercial or
financial information may cause competitive harm or justify confidential treatment without actually falling within the "trade secret" boundaries. Individual recovery may nevertheless be
foreclosed. See note 75 supra.
"0'Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(a)(2), 1491 (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1941 (Supp. V. 1975), are here relevant.
" 5'Vigil v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1176, 1184 (D. Colo. 1968). Focusing on the fifth
amendment claim, and not a tort, allows a plaintiff to bring himself within the boundaries of the
Tucker Act, notwithstanding the prohibition against claims "sounding in tort." See, e.g., Basso v.
United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 202, 215-16 (1905).
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-63, 267 (1946) (specific "taking" facts);
Yearsley v. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 23 (1940) (no "taking" shown thus claim
untenable); Vigil v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1176, 1184 (D. Colo. 1968).
10728 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (1970).

"°'See, e.g., Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (alleging specific
acts of negligence); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 38 (1953).
1028 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). Discretionary acts are expressly excepted from the scope of
the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970). See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 33-34 (1953) (acting according to one's best judgment). Subordinate's acts and omissions are not actionable. Id.
at 36. Such specificity of action by the individual and preclusion of nonofficial's acts forecloses
recovery for untraceable information leaks.
"'See note 109 supra.
"'The Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted to allow existing suits against the government
which had been foreclosed by sovereign immunity, not to create new causes of action. See, e.g.,
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950). Thus, actions seem to be limited to those arising out of trade secrets unless release of any confidential information were redefined as a tort.
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the Act's sections are read narrowly," 2 extension of the Act to potential leaks
of confidential information is unlikely. However, because both the Tucker
Act and Federal Tort Claims Act sustain the compensation policy here
sought, claims under both Acts could be brought alternatively to see if their
minimal extension to confidential information destruction could be
countenanced.
Private legislative acts provide a viable alternative.11 3 These acts confer
jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear private parties' claims against the
United States for damages suffered from governmental action." 4 The constitutionality of such acts has been upheld," 5 and their use is emphasized
where all other redress is foreclosed by sovereign immunity." 6 Such acts are
strictly construed," 7 however, and their applicability depends upon congressional consent to suit in particular situations. Thus, while affording potential
redress, they provide a lesser guarantee of recovery than would specific
legislation waiving immunity for a class within which an aggrieved party
might bring itself.
Enactment of a specific statutory provision by Congress is appropriate
because of the desirability of protecting valuable property rights, a policy Congress has directly supported by precluding public
dissemination of confidential information in virtually all other contexts." 8
Although such a statutory provision generally requires clamor for relief suffi"'See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950). See also Fitch v. United States, 513
F.2d 1013, 1016 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975) (Act does not give courts powers of equity).
1""[W]e observe that our action dismisses Appellees' complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
does not jeopardize their opportunity to secure compensation from Congress for the injustice that
befell them." Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir. 1975) (rejecting assertion of
jurisdiction based on Federal Tort Claims Act).
1"See, e.g., United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203, 204 n.2 (1941); Mizokami v. United
States, 414 F.2d 1375, 1376-77 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Wright v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 943 (Ct. Cl.
1951). Private legislation sometimes confers jurisdiction on district courts. See, e.g., Grant v.
United States, 192 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1951).
115

Congress is the lawmaking branch of the Government, and laws made by it are not unconstitutional because they are special, applicable to only one or some persons, rather
than of general application, or because they are retrospective and applicable to fact
situations which have occurred before their enactment ...
. . . [S]pecial acts of Congress . . . are constitutional, if they confer rights on
private litigants against the Government, which rights are intended by Congress to
fulfill a legal or moral obligation of the Government.
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 18-19 (1944). See also Pope v.
United States, 323 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1944).
"MCongressional committees approving private act relief, notwithstanding recommendations
by the Department of Justice and Health, Education and Welfare that relief be denied as
specifically precluded by the Federal Tort Claims Act, have noted:
The committee feels that the Government's admission of error and expression of regret
for the incident is a commendable act. However, as is apparent . . . the Mizokami
Bros. have no other way to be compensated for any damages or losses caused by the
Government's erroneous actions but to appeal to Congress.
Mizokami v. United States, 414 F.2d 1375, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (emphasis in original).
"'See, e.g., United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203, 210 (1941).
isSee note 4 supra.
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the lack of alternative remedy and substantial
cient to warrant enactment,
damage potential in this class of cases justifies the relief proposed. In fact,
congressional energy directed to enactment of a specific provision conserves
time potentially spent on a series of private act requests.

CONCLUSION

Intensified protection for confidential business information transmitted to
Congress is imperative to prevent its unwarranted public dissemination. Three
approaches to the protection of this material have been examined here.
Stricter agency standards for release of confidential data achieved
through modification of current agency rules and regulations would preclude
unauthorized access by nonofficial congressional parties. Absent strengthening
of release standards by the agencies, the judiciary has two opportunities to
supplement confidentiality protections. Judicial enforcement of subpoena
standards prior to transmission of information to Congress could deter
unauthorized access to confidential data. After congressional receipt of such
data, the judiciary can provide an objective judgment of the deliberation
behind specific disclosures to avert the careless mishandling resulting in
public dissemination.
Finally, but most significantly, Congress itself must act responsibly to
guarantee the procedural and substantive protections necessary for confidential information. Strengthened congressional procedures in handling confidential information, if strictly enforced, should obviate the need for supplementary protections by eliminating the fear of and the potentiality of public
dissemination. Such precautionary congressional self-restraint is appropriate,
for Congress has already dictated nondissemination of such data in other contexts.
Should disclosure occur regardless of procedural precautions, governmental compensation must be made available to prevent or redress unequal impact on owners of information. Pervasive governmental intrusion into private
rights has been found justified unless that action arbitrarily visits substantial
injury on a party. Specific legislation protecting confidential information
should extend this recovery policy to confirm equal treatment of parties and
the ideals of competition. Open and active government should nourish honesty
and integrity in government for competent public representation. It must not,
however, be allowed to stultify private initiative and consequently contravene
the public interest.
BARBARA J. SMITH
lls

Relief was often sought and sometimes granted through private bills in Congress, the
number of which steadily increased as Government activity increased. The volume of
these private bills, the inadequacy of congressional machinery for determination of
facts, the importunities to which claimants subjected members of Congress, and the
capricious results, led to a strong demand that claims for tort wrongs be submitted to
adjudication.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).

